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STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

LEADING CHANGE SHAPING PEACE AND STABILITY IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

BY

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U.S. AWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

LEADING CHANGE

Shaping Peace and Stability in Sub-Saharan Africa

by

LTC Carl D. Owens

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ABSTRACT

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Shaping Peace and Stability in Sub-Saharan Africa

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The African continent is about 3.5 times the size of the United States and is populated by people who are tremendously diverse in their cultural, ethnic, and religious heritage. U.S. foreign policy in Sub-Saharan Africa has always lacked focus and consistency and that is not likely to change. The Clinton administration has designed a new strategy for shaping positive change in Africa. The Clinton administration believes that the United States has important interests in Africa. The administration hopes that their new initiatives will produce a greater number of success stories for Africans and fewer tragedies that result in U.S. intervention. The purpose of this strategic research project is to analyze U.S. foreign policy in the complex and diverse region of Sub-Saharan Africa.

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INTRODUCTION

The African continent is about 3.5 times the size of the United States and is populated by people who are tremendously diverse in their cultural, ethnic, and religious heritage. It consists of more than 50 nations, with more than 650 million residents speaking more than 1,000 languages. It is generally accepted within the academic and governmental bureaucratic circles that the Muslim countries that comprise the northern part of Africa are culturally, geopolitically, and economically distinct from the African countries located south of the Sahara desert. The northern part of Africa is treated as a part of the Middle East region and is called "North Africa." In contrast, the countries located south of the Sahara desert have little or no homogenous cultural, geopolitical, or economical similarities but are referred to collectively as a region called "Sub-Saharan Africa." Varying terrain and vast distances between villages and the nations exist in this region.

The Sub-Saharan African nations were shaped in complex and diverse ways as a result of colonialism.² Almost all Sub-Saharan Africa countries are besieged with some combination of political, economic, social, or security problems. Yet, it is difficult to make any substantive generalizations about the root causes of these problems because of the shear vastness and diversity of this region. Some U.S. policy analysts consider finding any long term solutions for the region's problems to be hopeless, while others only have visions of the region's potential for future success with some help from America. These analysts have conflicting viewpoints about Sub-Saharan Africa's future because their viewpoints about Sub-Saharan Africa were shaped based on their education, cultural, political, religious or ethnic values.³

The Clinton administration desires to shape positive change in Sub-Saharan Africa by partnering with a new generation of African leaders for the mutual benefit of the nations. The President's strategy features the use of the economic instrument of power to help Sub-Saharan Africa move into the global economy. The administration believes it must act now to leverage U.S. private investment in the region or lose the opportunity to shape positive changes in Africa that will protect U.S. long-term interests. Administration officials view Africa as a land of opportunities with problems that can be overcome using minimal resources today. The administration wants to actively engage this region because the costs of continued complacency in U.S. engagement with Africans could result in Americans wasting scarce resources to deal with Africa's problems in the future. This paper analyzes how well the Clinton administration's strategy for engaging Sub-Saharan Africa serves U.S. interests. This paper also provides recommendations concerning methods to resolve problems and obstacles associated with the administration's strategy.

THE CLINTON STRATEGY

The Clinton administration subscribes to a doctrine of engaging struggling countries to assist them through the process of democratic transition and the establishment of free market economies. Trade and economics have become the centerpiece of the Clinton administration's foreign policy efforts. The administration's belief that trade and economics are key instruments of national power that can help struggling countries and protect U.S. interests was born out of the successful impact that these instruments had in rescuing the Mexican economy from the brink of disaster. Mexico has repaid its debts ahead of schedule, inflation is down drastically, and the

North American Free Trade Agreement has resulted in record number private businesses investing in Mexico.⁴ Administration officials believe that a similar approach can be applied to Sub-Saharan Africa. This region has received the particular attention of the Clinton administration, including an unprecedented White House conference on Africa held during June 1994. The administration has successful encouraged democratic transitions in South Africa, Namibia, Benin, Niger, Mali, Zambia, and Malawi and is encouraging continued political reform and progress towards fully democratic systems in Ethiopia, Eritrea, Uganda, and Mozambique.⁵

South Africa is perhaps the best example of an African nation moving towards full democracy and free trade with U.S. support. Since 1994, the U.S. has disbursed over \$630 million in assistance to South Africa. This aid has benefited South African entrepreneurs and farmers, while supporting housing, education, and health services for the poorest South Africans.⁶ The U.S. White House has acknowledged that the United States has a special relationship with South Africa. The U.S. White House national security strategy, published in May 1997, states that the U.S. desires "to help South Africa to achieve its economic, political and democratic goals by continuing to provide substantial bilateral assistance, providing support through the Binational Commission and by aggressively promoting U.S. trade with and investment in South Africa." 7 The Clinton administration wants the other African countries that are striving for democracy and free trade, much like South Africa, to receive investments from private U.S. business, too. Therefore, the administration has launched a new initiative called the Partnership for Economic Growth and Opportunity in Africa to help them.⁸ It is believed that this initiative will elevate the low level of political interests given to African issues since the end of the Cold War and make positive changes in U.S.-African relations.

During the Cold War era, the U.S. military had a number of geostrategic interests in the African continent. U.S. Cold War era military interests were the protection of U.S. sea lines of communication, fending off a real or imagined Soviet plan to capture Africa's strategic minerals, prying Cuban surrogates off the continent, and preventing the establishment of Soviet bases and listening posts. Few if any of these interests survived the end of the Cold War. Since the Cold War ended, a sharp decline has occurred in U.S. financial aid and diplomatic engagement in Africa. However, inspite of this decline in relative importance to the United States, during the 1990's U.S. policymakers committed U.S. military forces to more than thirteen operations in Sub-Saharan Africa. ¹⁰

These crisis events that occurred in African countries such as Liberia, Angola, Somalia and Rwanda were responsible for stimulating U.S. public debate and concern about the inconsistency between the level U.S. policy planning and military intervention in Africa. During the last two decades, U.S. foreign policy in this region has lacked focus, consistency and the personal involvement of America's senior leaders. U.S. policymakers experienced difficulty in effectively communicating to the general public the link between their diplomatic, economic and military actions in the region and U.S. national interests. "U.S. policymakers had no coherent national security strategy for the region that clearly identified regional interests and then specified appropriate ways and means to secure them." Effective leadership moves people in a direction that is genuinely in their real long-term best interests. 12

The consequences of using U.S. military power during the Somalia operation are a good example of what can go wrong when the interests of Africans are not fully considered and balanced against U.S. objectives and interests. U.S. policymakers failed to use consistent

national interest criteria when they made the decision to conduct U.S. military operations to provide humanitarian relief to the people of Somalia. The use of U.S. military forces for these operations did not adhere to any strict criteria because there were no common factors linking these military interventions to U.S. interests. The influence of the international news coverage and special interest groups on U.S. public opinion and policymakers was the most likely factor for U.S. involvement.¹³

Greater starvation and suffering existed in Mozambique, South Africa, and Sudan when the U.S. military conducted operations in Somalia. ¹⁴ If relieving the suffering of others was in the U.S. interests, then why did U.S. policymakers not use the U.S. military forces to intervene in the other countries where the suffering was much greater? This case and others similar to it demonstrate the problems associated with letting the media and public opinion influence U.S. policymakers to use inappropriate instruments of national power. U.S. interests in this region should have been identified and a strategy for using minimal appropriate national instruments of power should have been put into action to protect U.S. interests.

U.S. interests in the region would have been better served if the U.S. had acted in concert with the regional governments and non-government organizations that had a better understanding of the nature of the interests at stake for America and the Somali people. Perhaps, this ineffective use of U.S. power could have been avoided had senior U.S. policymakers paid more consistent attention to the region and diplomatically engaged African leaders for mutual benefit. The failure of U.S. policymakers to consult regularly with a broad range of African leaders in the formulation and execution of U.S. foreign policy actions in the region has resulted in great frustrations for U.S. diplomats who work in African affairs and Africans themselves. ¹⁵

These individuals are frustrated because they believe that the United States has several important interests in this region such as promoting regional stability, democracy and access to economic opportunity which can be protected by diplomatic means with no increases in U.S. government financial aid to the region. Promoting regional stability ranks as the first priority because it provides the conditions for using minimal U.S. instruments of power to protect the rest of the U.S. interests. A condition of regional stability can be define as the absence of significant interstate or intrastate acts of violence such as violent border disputes, civil wars, insurgencies, and oppressive regimes. ¹⁶

Many U.S. policy analysts believe that the United States has important economic long-term interests in Sub-Saharan African but the short-term economic interests are impeded by acts of violence, social unrest, and the absence of civil society in the region. Violence and political instability in the region has discouraged private businesses from investing Sub-Saharan Africa because businessmen fear that the numerous occurrences of violence pose a threat their personal safety and a risk to their property investments. Also, Africans who are constantly moving because of fear for their lives are provided with few opportunities for the education and training needed to be reliable employees to support industry needs. One goal of the Clinton administration's initiative is to resolve conflict and maintain peace in the region so that private businesses will have greater confidence about their safety concerns and Africans will have better education and training opportunities.

It is anticipated that Africa's largely untapped market of 600-700 million people has the potential to become enthusiastic consumers of U.S. products if their standard of living were improved.¹⁸ The Clinton administration hopes that increasing the education and employment of

Africans will result increasing their standard of living and the demand for American consumer goods over time. U.S. trade with this region is currently very low because Africans lack employment and purchasing power. It is believed that this situation can be improved and that Africans will buy more western products as their standards of living increase.¹⁹

Africa has a huge population of people whose meager earnings do not provide them with enough money to purchase many of the consumer goods that the people of most developed nations consider being necessities. It is believed that this untapped market will be very profitable for industries that specialize in providing the necessities of life such as hygiene products and other consumables that are not currently unaffordable for much of Africa's people. Companies like Gillette have made huge profits and controlled majority shares of the available market by under taking the risk of joint ventures in new markets. For example, Gillette was the first Western company to crack the Chinese market and it now controls 80% of China's \$51 million razor blade market. ²⁰

With a population of greater than 650 million, 20% of the world's land area, and a wealth of natural resources and biological diversity, the Clinton administration and other supporting groups such as the Congressional Black Caucus, advocate that Sub-Saharan Africa should not be ignored or neglected. They believe that there is enormous human and natural resource potential in Africa, which Africans can use for their own betterment. The possibility exists that Africa has greater economic potential for the U.S. than that of Eastern Europe. The U.S. State Department says that U.S. exports to Africa currently exceed those to the New Independent States of the former Soviet Union combined, (including Russia) by more than 20 percent. Two-way trade

between the United States and Africa reached \$18 billion during 1995 and one hundred thousand U.S. jobs depended on exports to Africa.²²

PROBLEMS WITH THE CLINTON STRATEGY

During December 8-15, 1997, the President sent Secretary of State, Ms. Madeleine Albright to visit the African nations of Ethiopia, Uganda, Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Angola, South Africa and Zimbabwe. Her visit to Africa was designed to send a message to Africans and the world that America's senior leaders are serious about engaging in a partnership with the new emerging democracies of Africa. According to Ms. Albright, the message that she conveyed on behalf of President Clinton was that the U.S. wants African countries to succeed and that the U.S. is prepared to help them do. ²³

However, after her African tour on behalf of the President, critics accused Ms. Albright of not having meaningful discussions with African leaders on human rights and corruption issues.

They accused her of signaling that the Clinton administration is willing to tolerate some failures on the human rights and corruption fronts from the new African leaders, who showed long-term good intentions towards establishing a market economies.²⁴ These U.S. foreign policy analysts feel that President Clinton's policy initiative is short-sighted because it only addresses economics and ignores the human rights and corruption issues in Africa.

In regard to the issue of human rights, some U.S. foreign policy analysts argue that the Clinton Administration has been too quick to trade America's fundamental belief in the principles of human rights and free press for the opportunity to engage a new generation of African leaders who support free market economies. Critics accuse the Clinton administration of using the attractive lure of economic gain as a domestic marketing ploy to generate U.S. general

public interest in Africa. They believe that the new African leaders "have yet to prove that they are not a more sophisticated, smoother-talking brand of their authoritarian predecessors." 25

Ms. Pauline Baker, executive director of the Fund of Peace and a longtime analyst of democracy issues in Sub-Saharan Africa, said that the new generation of African leaders "pay more attention to economic development ...but they can be just as undemocratic as the previous leaders." She cites the example of the president of Uganda, Yoweri K. Museveni, as one of Africa's new leaders, who knows how "to talk the talk" of democracy to gain western financial support without fostering a democratic environment in his country. Uganda will get \$750 million from donors this year, which includes \$250 million from the World Bank. Museveni has "become a darling of major international donors such as the World Bank and the United States."

Museveni is described as being charming and articulate. He regularly grants interviews to the western media but does not like it when reporters challenge his leadership record. Museveni is a former Marxist who believes that economic growth must precede liberal democratic growth and political change. Museveni's critics believe that Uganda's "no-party" democracy does not uphold the true principles of democracy, such as human rights and free press. These critics feel that western leaders, who support Museveni, are overlooking his democratic shortcomings only because "his attention to Uganda's economy has made it among Africa's strongest this decade, with a consistent growth rates of 5 percent and above." Uganda's economy is thriving and its leadership appears on the surface to be serious about battling corruption.

Stephen Buckley, a Washington Post foreign service reporter, says that new leaders, similar to Museveni, all came to power through rebellions and it is far from clear that the new generation of

African leaders are committed to smothering nurturing stable democracies or corruption.

Buckley highlights the point which some analysts argue, for example, that these new African leaders may appear to be concerned about corruption only because the World Bank and other key donors have recently begun to pressure them to address it. These new African leaders have close relations with their major western donors and receive hundreds of millions of dollars in aid annually. Some critics question if the new African leaders say they despise corruption and support democratic values only to gain financial support from western donors and favorable western press coverage.²⁸

With regard to the issue of corruption, the *U.S. News and World Report* describes why doing business in Africa can be a constant struggle because of corruption and the rapid change in government officials." Contracts are often subject to the whim of local officials who expect to be paid in return for granting and enforcing agreements. Laurent Kablia, the new president of the former country of Zaire, now called the Democratic Republic of Congo, is an example of new governments cause frustrations when investing in some African countries. The rebel leader, Kabila, simply canceled the previous regime's mineral deals and seized \$50 million in rolling stock from a largely South African-owned railway company.³⁰

In addition to the challenges of corruption, much of Africa is not fully integrated into the world trading system because of the limited availability and the poor condition of its infrastructure i.e., telecommunications, roads, ports, power, water, and sanitation. Today, the U.S. accounts for only 7 % of global exports to the Africa and Africa only contributes 1% to world trade flows. Although investment flows to other developing regions have increased in recent years, investment flows into Africa have lagged, even thought, U.S. investment in Africa

usually generate high returns. Since 1981, Africa's share of U.S. investment flows to developing countries declined from 8.9% to only 2.9% in 1994.³¹ This decline was due primarily to increased investments in countries in Latin America and the Far East.

Given the current decline in U.S. aid and investment in Africa, many Americans and Africans are wondering, how long will President Clinton's enthusiasm for African affairs last?

Ms. Albright's visit to Africa was quickly followed by President Clinton's visit to Africa during March 1998. The Clinton administration wanted Ms Albright's visit to showcase a new policy of being more engaged in Africa for reasons other than the charitable actions of humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping operations. President Clinton is the first U.S. president to visit Africa in more than 22 years. During this trip the President held a summit for peace with the leaders of the Great Lakes region.

It is believed that Great Lakes region has the greatest potential for serious conflict because conflict in the region could lead to a broader regional war. The President hopes that diplomacy will protect U.S. interests in the region. It is in the U.S. interests "to promote a long-term program to encourage and assist in the transformation of the African security environment into one where violence is less common and where most violence that does occur can be dealt with without massive outside involvement." The U.S. Department of Defense has been given the task of conflict resolution, management and resolution to support U.S. policy in Africa.

ROLE OF THE U.S. MILITARY

The Clinton Administration has tasked the Department of Defense to provide military assistance and conduct training in Africa. The U.S. European Command (EUCOM)

Headquarters, located in Germany, has responsibility for almost all U.S. military forces in

Africa. ³⁴ General James L. Jamerson, who is the EUCOM Deputy Commander in Chief, recently made an official visit to a number of African nations. He provided a briefing to foreign policy specialists at the Center for International and Strategic Studies (CSIS) on November 19, 1997. During the briefing, he explained what his command does to further U.S. national interest in Africa. General Jamerson said that EUCOM intends to play an active role in supporting the Clinton administration's policy of ongoing engagement with Africa. EUCOM is trying to shape the environment by helping Africans build their own sustainable military response to humanitarian crises becuase it believes that a local African military response team has the potential to be beneficial to all parties involved. ³⁵ It is believed that African military response teams should be more cost effective and efficient than using troops from the United States or Europe because the teams would be located close to crisis sites. It is also believed that the African military response teams should have a better understanding of the problems between African nations because Africans are far more likely to understand the historical and culture contexts of the root issues that led to the crisis. ³⁶

Between 20 and 30 military training exercises a year are conducted in Africa by U.S. military forces. This training is conducted primarily by U.S. Army Special Forces teams and covers subject areas such as rifle marksmanship, noncommissioned officer leadership training, and medical. EUCOM also deploys medical personnel to two African nations a year. Medical teams go into a country and conduct disaster response/mass casualty training exercise with its African counterparts. This is aimed at building a sustainable medical response capability among Africans.³⁷

The U.S. military's focus on Africa is long-range. EUCOM has a planning process that it uses to lay out what its objectives are, what resources are available for use, and how the resources are going to be used to achieve its objectives in Africa.³⁸ Part of EUCOM's plan, is to "build lasting relationships and enduring institutions," and key to that effort is the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI).³⁹ ACRI is a bilateral endeavor with a number of African nations who seek to enhance their peacekeeping capabilities. Training of about three battalions of soldiers has been completed in Senegal, Uganda, and Malawi. More training of African units by U.S. Army Special Forces will be undertaken in order to meet the goal of approximately 10,000 trained troops that the ACRI concept envisions. The U.S. government is working with nations like France, Britain, and other allies to build a homegrown African capacity to respond to humanitarian crises.⁴⁰

A small investment in Africa by the United States may eliminate a larger response in the future. It is also hoped that ACRI will provide several other benefits, such as, the development of military networks to facilitate the planning and execution of U.S. military operations to protect vital U.S. interests in other regions of the world, the development of a better understanding of the African operational environment and improved military-civil relations. Some policy analysts believe that ACRI will have a positive impact on civil-military relations in the host countries since much of the training concerns appropriate ways for those in uniform to deal with civilians. Improved military-civil relations will improve Sub-Saharan Africa's peace and stability while advancing the efforts of human rights, democratic reform, and free trade.

ACRI training is focused on such peacekeeping skills as convoy security, dealing with humanitarian NGOs (non-governmental organizations), and water purification. It also focuses on

communications skills in order to give the Africans who participate in the initiative the opportunity to gain an interoperability that they would not otherwise have. ACRI will not be standing African army. ACRI will be a peacekeeping capability that the United Nations or the Organization of African Unity (OAU) can call upon with short notice to respond to a particular crisis situation. U.S. officials anticipate that in most cases it would be the United Nations Security Council that would make the decision whether or not international action was required in a particular situation and whether African participation was desired in UN-funded or mandated operation.

A goal of the ACRI concept is to create a cadre of between 5,000 and 10,000 troops, who have trained together, have common communications equipment and the skills to move as interoperable units - that doesn't exist now. ACRI provides the United States with a means to limit U.S. military interventionism in Africa. United States participation in ACRI is limited to providing U.S. leadership in specific fields, such as, conflict-resolution training, military logistics and other specialized support, help for demining and demobilization efforts, and determined and coherent diplomatic backstopping of negotiated settlements so that they get implemented. As

The ACRI concept has its critics and has been challenged by several of America's European allies and their former African colonies. Europeans continue to guard their influence over their former colonies. They are skeptical that ACRI is American attempt to gain access to raw materials and minerals on the African continent. Many African countries are opposed to ACRI because they have not been invited to participate in the program or believe that the existence of ACRI undermines the importance of regional organizations which have an established role in

conflict resolution, such as, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC). ⁴⁴ In addition to those who criticize ACRI for political reasons, there are those who criticize the ACRI concept because of its operational shortcomings. ACRI training is perishable. It has command and control, logistics, planning and mobility problems. It does not train the African police forces, which play a vital role in peacekeeping operations. ⁴⁵

CONCLUSION

U.S. foreign policy in Sub-Saharan Africa has always lacked focus and consistency and that is not likely to change. However, the personal involvement that the senior leaders of Clinton administration have given to Africa has been unprecedented and provides hope that U.S. policy toward Africa will produce a greater number of success stories and fewer tragedies. However, the Clinton administration has no quick fixes or easy solutions for the region's problems. The administration's strategy for change is running into a number of problems because the administration is trying to satisfy a vast number of different interests groups.

While the Clinton Administration would like to communicate an effective set of policy actions that will result in benefits for all Americans and Africans -- this outcome is not likely to occur. The United States resources are constrainted and it does not have the resources available to satisfy every African nations' needs. However, it is possible for the administration lead to America and a highly select group of African nations through positive changes to protect U.S. interests. The administration must utilize its scarce resources only where there is a decent possibility of achieving positive results. U.S. policy should be focused on rewarding the new generation of Africa leaders like Nelson Mandela, who bring real change to their people rather

than those new leaders such as Kablia who capture and maintain their leadership through oppression and corruption.

African needs the kind of leadership from the international community that simply tells corrupt African leaders that the world will not do business with them until they take serious steps to improve the quality of life for the people of their nations. The increased demand and competition for financial support and development aid from donors, such as the U.S., Asia, Europe, and the UN, as a result of the end of the Cold War, places the international community in a unique position to ask more of Africa's leaders who desire assistance. The opportunity is now right for the international community of leaders to demand that African leaders bring an end to corruption in their governments and establish professional police forces that respect and protect the human rights of its citizens.

The Clinton Administration should implement enduring policies which will raise the quality of life in some regions of Sub-Saharan Africa, while being upfront about the fact that the cost of change will result in many countries of Sub-Saharan Africa being left to struggle at or below their current states of existence. Africa's leaders must hold themselves accountable for educating and training their citizens to participate in a global market place or face economics sanctions from the United States. For example, in the case, where the rebel leader, Kabila, simply canceled the previous regime's mineral deals and seized \$50 million in rolling stock from a largely South African-owned railway company. Had this been an U.S. citizen owned-business and the United States were actively engaged in diplomatic relations with Kabila, then perhaps some diplomatic leverage could have been applied to resolve the situation. If a diplomatic settlement was not reached, then OPIC would cover a substantial amount of the business losses

and economic sanctions could be levy against Kabila's government until the issue was resolved.⁴⁶

Long-term support from the international community and the efforts of Africans themselves are needed to build adequate diplomatic and financial resources to promote peaceful change, conflict resolution, stable democracy, and sustainable development in the region. America should forge a strong partnership with the United Nations political and peace-making bureaucracies that are often the most appropriate entities to be out in front in dealing with Africa's problems. The U.S. can help to reform and strengthen the United Nations by setting the example for developed nations and paying its fair-share of the membership dues.⁴⁷

The Clinton administration should not only support UN efforts but it should actively support regional organizations in their efforts to find solutions to Africa's problems. The administration should seek to engage organizations such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) to expand their current roles in the region. The ECOWAS is now carrying out an unprecedented peacekeeping operation in Liberia, even though, many are concerned about the possibility that Nigerian forces may want to dominate the region. Additionally, the United States should continue to encourage the OAU and SADC take on new missions ranging from peace-keeping and conflict mediation to election and human rights monitoring. African efforts in collective security to bring African solutions to African problems will result in long-term stability and development for the continent. In return for African leaders accepting expanded roles in the region the United States should provide political and financial support as well as technical assistance and trainingin the areas of commerce, treasury, and transportation 148

The shear vastness and diversity of Sub-Saharan Africa makes the task of formulating an effective all or nothing foreign policy strategy for this region difficult. Change in the current U.S. foreign policy towards Sub-Saharan Africa will require the skillful use of a number of change tactics such as education/communication with the public, participation by the U.S. Congress, U.S. executive branch agencies, African governments and interest groups, the non-governmental agencies, and negotiations. The Clinton administration hopes that trips to Africa will build a coalition of backers and supporters, articulate and communicate a shared vision and assign responsibility and accountability to executive agencies, as well as educate the American public and demonstrate the African successes. Most U.S. diplomats who work in African affairs and Africans themselves merely hope that the Clinton administration's travels to Africa will help Americans and the world learn more about the progress being made throughout the region.

The ACRI is making short term progress towards positive change in Sub-Saharan Africa.

African nations participating in ACRI training are becoming more confident in their militaries' ability to fulfill their peacekeeping needs and to protect the human rights of its citizens. Some African nations such as Senegal and Uganda are effectively contributing to international peacekeeping efforts in Haiti and Bosnia as a result of having benefited from ACRI training.

Considering the positive effects of ACRI, the U.S. military should continue to develop close and professional military-to-military ties with the participating African nations. These ties provide the United States with an opportunity to expose Africa militaries to America's notions of discipline, professionalism, and lasting service to our nation. Strengthening and expanding United States military-to-military programs with Africans is an inexpensive way to give Africans

short term tools to make long term progress in their economic and democratic processes. (Word Count 5,260)

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- The White House, <u>A National Security Strategy for a New Century</u> (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, May 1997), 36.
- Dan Henk and Steven Metz. The United States and the Transformation of African Security: The African Crisis Response Initiative and Beyond, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 5 December 1997, p. 31.

- ³⁴ The U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) is responsible for U.S. military forces operationing in Kenya and the region in Africa called the Horn.
- Jim Fisher-Thompson, U.S. Deputy European Commander Cities Engagement in Africa, <u>U.S.I.A.</u>, 26 November 1997.
 - 36 Ibid.
 - 37 Ibid.
 - 38 Ibid.
 - 39 Ibid
- ⁴⁰Jim Fisher-Thompson, "ACRI to be Priority Item on Albright Dec. 8-15 Africa Visit," 4 Dec 97.
 - 41 Dan Henk and Steven Metz, p. viii.
 - 42 Ibid.
- Grocker, "Why Africa is Important," Foreign Service Journal, June 1995, Volume 72, Number 6, pp. 29-30.
 - 44 Dan Henk and Steven Metz, p. 23.
 - 45 Ibid, p. viii.
- 46 According to The Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), "Frequently Asked Questions" available from http://www.opic.gov/subdocs/faqs.html p.1, 4 March 1998. OPIC is a self-sustaining U.S. government agency that supports American private investment in developing nations and emerging market economies around the world by selling financial services that are not commercially available. These services include long-term political risk insurance and limited project financing. OPIC earns revenues from the sale of these services and help the American economy grow. According, to OPIC records, projects approved in 1996 will generate \$9.6 billion in U.S. exports and help to create and support 30,000 American jobs.
- Herman J. Cohen, "U.S. Policy Toward Africa," <u>Foreign</u> <u>Service Journal</u>, June 1995, p. 38.
- ⁴⁸ Asst Sect Rice speech to the African Studies Association in Columbus, Ohio on 28 November 1997.

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